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Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from
cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from
antibiotics overuse to biodiversity preservation. An important, and so far overlooked, aspect of
reality is the diverse strategic identities of individuals. While applying the same strategy to all
interaction partners may be an acceptable assumption for simpler forms of life, this fails to account
for the behavior of more complex living beings. For instance, we humans act differently around
different people. Here we show that allowing individuals to adopt different strategies with different
partners yields a very rich evolutionary dynamics, including time-dependent coexistence of coop-
eration and defection, system-wide shifts in the dominant strategy, and maturation in individual
choices. Our results are robust to variations in network type and size, and strategy updating rules.
Accounting for diverse strategic identities thus has far-reaching implications in the mathematical
modeling of social games.
Game theory owes its popularity to its ability of de-
scribing social interactions as well as the gist of conflict-
ing situations in economics and politics [1]. An impor-
tant paradigm shift was the introduction of evolutionary
games [2], which focus on the interaction and compe-
tition between different strategies. Today, evolutionary
games are the workhorse for studying frequency depen-
dent selection in biological system, and they are used
prolifically to investigate cooperation and competition in
economic, social, and technological systems [3, 4]. In gen-
eral, evolutionary games allow modelers to make the in-
teractions within a system measurable and interpretable,
which pairs particularly well with network science [5–10].
A frequently used subclass of evolutionary games is
that of social dilemmas, in which what is best for the
individual player conflicts with what is best for the soci-
ety as a whole [11]. Such situations are commonplace in
modern human societies, applying as much to the abuse
of power in leadership as to climate inaction and the
over-exploitation of natural resources. Much research
has been devoted to the resolution of social dilemmas
on networks [12–20], with results pointing to the fact
that the network topology (and its possible temporal
changes) is essential to determine the system’s evolution
[21, 22]. For instance, hubs in scale-free networks can act
as strong facilitators of cooperation [23], extending the
∗ Corresponding author: irene.sendina@urjc.es
survival range well past the boundaries of traditional net-
work reciprocity [24]. Moreover, a solution for weak se-
lection applicable to any kind of graph has been recently
obtained based on calculating the coalescence times of
random walks [19].
So far, studies of evolutionary dynamics in structured
populations have typically assumed that each individual
adopts a single strategy with all their interaction part-
ners [25]. For organisms with no or limited self-awareness
and intelligence, this assumption may be indeed rea-
sonable: bacteria, for instance, are not always able to
change their genotype based on their surroundings [26],
and similarly a worker bee can hardly break with the
hive and go about exploring alternatives. However, the
assumption becomes unrealistic for more complex living
beings. Because evolutionary games are increasingly used
to study complex phenomena in human societies [27–35],
the time is ripe – actually the need is urgent – for the
relaxation of this monotony, and for the account of the
obvious fact that we act differently with certain people
than we do around others [36, 37]. And this is of course
likewise true for many other animals.
Moreover, monotonic strategies lead, in general, to
time stationary network’s arrangements, implying the
setting (from a given time on) of a population of simple-
tons where the identity of each unit is that of a permanent
cooperator or of a permanent defector. This is also far
from properly representing real interactions in human or
animal societies, wherein members actually alternate co-
operation and defection in time. In social systems, for
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FIG. 1. Diversity in strategic identities induces time-dependent states. Heatmaps (with colorbar on top) of ρ (panels
a and d), σρ (panels b and e), and ` (panels c and f) in the parameter space (α, b/c). See text for the definitions of all quantities.
Panels a-c refer to SF networks, whereas panels d-f refer to ER graphs. Simulations were performed over Tf = 10, 000 times
units, while the time-averaging of all quantities was made over the last T = 2, 000 steps. Each point is obtained by a further
ensemble average over 10 network realizations with size N = 1, 000 and average degree 〈k〉 = 4. Isolines at the values of ρ =0.5,
0.7, and 0.9 are drawn in panels a and d. The isoline at the value of σρ =0.03 is reported in panels b and e. Three different
regimes can be identified: i) a stationary state in which cooperation dominates the network, at sufficiently large b/c ratios and
sufficiently small α values (the red point labeled with C and located at (36,0.03) in panels a,b); ii) the classical regime for
b/c < 〈k〉 where defection becomes dominant and cooperators can no longer survive (the red point labeled with A and located
at (2.5,0.048) in the same panels); and iii) a novel dynamical state with coexisting cooperators and defectors (the red point
labeled with B and located at (5,0.048)). The emergence of the new state is a direct consequence of diversity in the players’
strategic identities.
instance, it has been observed that human propensity to
cooperation does vary in time, and this has important
consequences for the outcomes in decision conflicts [38],
competitive environments [39], and for long-run coopera-
tion [40]. In biophysical systems, changes in cooperative
behavior are observed over time due to population feed-
backs [41] or to varying resource availability [42]. Varying
cooperation propensities characterize, for instance, mi-
crobial populations, where microbes are known for their
dualistic roles, i.e., cooperate with some strains but de-
fect with others [43].
We then here abandon the monotonic assumption, and
show that taking instead into explicit account diverse
players’ identities induces a very rich dynamical reper-
toire, which includes several of such observed phenom-
ena: time-dependent coexistence of cooperation and de-
fection, systemic shifts in the network’s dominant strat-
egy, and the maturation of individual strategic choices.
Overall, our results show that it is crucial for individuals
to carefully gauge their strategic vectors for socially op-
timal evolutionary outcomes, thus revealing that diverse
strategic identities are essential for properly capturing a
vast number of behaviors observed in human societies.
We start by considering a network, G, made of N play-
ers (or units, or nodes), connected according to a sym-
metric adjacency matrix, A = (aij), where aij = 1 if
units i and j interact, and aij = 0 otherwise. Moreover,
ki =
∑N
j=1 aij is the number of neighbors of player i, also
called node i’s degree. A strategy matrix, S = (sij), is
introduced such that sij = 1 if player i cooperates with
player j, sij = 2 if player i defects from j, and sij = 0 if
aij = 0.
Our approach is in line with a stream of recent re-
search where edges (rather than vertices) are the centers
of evolutionary dynamics [44–48]. In particular, Ref. [44]
considered the ability to change the strategy along the
least productive edge (in terms of payoff) as a form of
punishment that ultimately promotes cooperation, and
the result has been later extended from rings and lattices
to well-mixed populations [45] and eventually to hetero-
geneous networks [46]. On the other hand, Ref. [47] as-
sumes that the edge strategy (cooperation or defection)
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FIG. 2. The coexistence of cooperators and defectors is characterized by system-wide shifts in the network
dominant strategy. Time evolution of ρ(t) (first row) and of the cooperation level ρi(t) of the 100 larger-degree players
in the network (second row, with color bar at the right). See text for definition of all quantities. Data refer to a single run
of the game on a single realization of an SF network with N = 1, 000 and 〈k〉 = 4. The game parameters correspond to
those marked by red points A (first column), B (second column), and C (third column) in Fig. 1a). In panel A1, defection
dominates over cooperation in a steady state, and all the strategies of individual players become soon constant in time (panel
A2). Conversely, in panel C1 cooperators ultimately dominate, though temporal fluctuations persist over a relatively large time
scale. The corresponding temporal profile of individual strategies (panel C2) exhibits fast temporal changes during the early
stages of the game before maturation of the individual strategic choices. In the novel state (panels B1 and B2), the coexistence
of cooperators and defectors is characterized by system-wide shifts in the dominant strategy. The horizontal lines in panel
B1 mark the transitions from periods during which cooperation is dominant (intervals with label TC) to time lapses during
which defection dominates instead (intervals with label TD). Maturity never takes place here, and players are forever trapped
in cycles of individual changes (panel B2).
yielding a higher payoff is likely to replace strategies pro-
ducing lower payoffs, and shows that this mechanism gen-
erally supports cooperation. Ref. [48] extends the idea
of edges being the centers of evolutionary dynamics by
suggesting that edges may also convey additional infor-
mation, such as genetic similarity, geographic proximity,
and social closeness. Moreover, Ref. [49] shows how the
heterogeneity of a group, in terms of skills and strategies,
can have implications at evolutionary level in the stability
of communities and in their size. Finally, in Ref. [50] the
public goods game is used to solve the Traveling Sales-
man Problem, under the hypothesis that agents may play
with a vector of strategies (each one corresponding to a
possible solution of the game), and therefore diversifica-
tion is somehow taken into account. We here show for
the first time that allowing individuals to adopt differ-
ent strategies with different partners yields a very rich
evolutionary dynamics, including time-dependent coex-
istence of cooperation and defection, system-wide shifts
in the dominant strategy, and maturation in individual
choices. Other approaches considered situations where
a game with one person can affect the results of a game
with another person (see, for instance, Ref. [51], where
the authors refer to this phenomenon as crosstalk. An im-
plicit assumption needed to implement crosstalk is that
an individual can distinguish between other individuals
with whom they play, which is an explicit assumption in
our study. Crosstalk impedes cooperation and requires
more forgiving strategies than, say, tit-for-tat, for coop-
eration to flourish.
Each player i is then here associated to a vector of
independent strategies, the dimension of which is degree
ki. In other words, in a particular instance of a game,
players can simultaneously cooperate with some of their
neighbors and defect with others. One further has ki =
kCi + k
D
i , where k
C
i =
∑
j|sij=1
aij (k
D
i =
∑
j|sij=2
aij) is the
time-dependent number of neighbors player i is currently
cooperating (defecting) with.
In the most representative and widely applicable social
dilemma, the prisoner’s dilemma [52], the interactions
between player pairs are governed by payoff matrix
P =
C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
which means that if player i cooperates and player j de-
4fects (C ↔ D), then player i incurs cost −c while player
j collects benefit b, and vice versa. On the other hand,
when two players cooperate among themselves (C ↔ C)
they both acquire amount b − c, corresponding to the
collected benefit from cooperation of the other agent mi-
nus the paid cost to cooperate. If two agents mutually
defect (D ↔ D), they both obtain a zero payoff. When
b > c > 0, the Nash equilibrium is mutual defection [53].
The gain or loss, gij , along each existing (aij = 1) link
is calculated using payoff matrix P as gij = P (sij , sji).
The average payoff of player i is therefore
gi =
1
ki
∑
j∈Λi
gij , (1)
where Λi is the set of neighbors of i. One can fur-
ther calculate each agent’s average payoff from be-
ing a cooperator or a defector separately, accord-
ing to gCi =
1
kCi
∑
j∈Λi|sij=1
P (C, sji) and g
D
i =
1
kD
i
∑
j∈Λi|sij=2 P (D, sji), respectively. At time t, the
network state can be tracked at various scales: micro-
scopically, one monitors each player’s cooperation level
ρi(t) =
kCi (t)
ki
, while macroscopically one refers to the
network average ρ(t) =
∑
i
ρi(t)
N . Moreover, ρ = 〈ρ(t)〉T
and and σρ are, respectively, the time-averaged coopera-
tion density over an observation time T and the standard
deviation of ρ(t).
Each player i is assumed to imitate the strategy
adopted against it by its neighbor with the highest total
payoff. Namely, at each step of the game, after play-
ers have collected their payoffs according to their current
strategies’ vectors, each player i considers
∆gi =
gs˜i − gi
b
, (2)
where gs˜i = max
j∈Λi
(gji) is the payoff of the neighbor j = s˜
inside Λi who earned the maximum.
Then, the player updates its ki strategies, i.e., it im-
itates the strategy (C or D) used against it by its best
neighbor along each one of its ki links with probability
p =
1
1 + e−
∆gi
α
, (3)
where α is a free parameter playing the role of an ef-
fective temperature in the above Fermi-Dirac function,
while ∆gi is the payoff balance (in units of the benefit b)
given by Eq. (2). If player i was already adopting the best
neighbor’s strategy along a given link ij, it simply keeps
that link unchanged. According to these definitions, it
may also happen that a given node i imitates, e.g., the C
strategy because that is what its best neighbor (node s˜)
played against it even if gCs˜ < g
D
s˜ . Put alternatively, the
player adopts C by imitating its best neighbor although
that neighbor is earning more from D than C.
We begin describing the results by showing in Fig. 1
three color maps that, from left to right, encode (i) the
cooperation density ρ, (ii) the associated standard de-
viation σρ, and (iii) the link strategy index defined by
`i = 1− |k
D
i −kCi |
ki
. This latter index quantifies the rigidity
of the strategy vectors: the index vanishes when players
have strategy vectors made of all cooperation or defec-
tion entries, whereas it gets larger and larger the more
diversified the players’ identities are. The color maps
are represented in the parameter plane of the system,
which is made of the cost-to-benefit ratio, b/c, and of
temperature α in the Fermi-Dirac function. Moreover,
the upper row shows the results obtained on scale-free
(SF) networks [54], while the bottom row shows the re-
sults obtained on random Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graphs [55].
To make the content of the Figure easily understandable,
isolines are drawn in panels a, b, d, and e.
In structured populations, natural selection favors co-
operation if the benefit of the altruistic act b divided by
cost c exceeds the average degree of the network 〈k〉 [12].
In our case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of
social viscosity even in the absence of reputation effects
or strategic complexity. The b/c > 〈k〉 rule is therefore a
good reference against which we can compare the impact
of diverse strategic identities on the evolution of cooper-
ation.
Panels a and d of Fig. 1 reveal that cooperation dom-
inates the entire network for sufficiently large b/c ratios
and sufficiently small α values. This regime is marked
with the red point C. When decreasing b/c, a rather
clear transition occurs at b/c ∼ 〈k〉 toward the classical
regime marked with the red point A in the same pan-
els, where defection becomes dominant and cooperators
no longer survive. In between these two extremes, how-
ever, a novel dynamical state emerges. The new state
consists of coexisting cooperators and defectors, and is
maintained by the evolutionary dynamics, yet in a dis-
tinct and time-dependent way. Namely, by looking at
the ensemble mean of the standard deviation and the
link strategy index shown in the middle and rightmost
panels, respectively, one can observe that different levels
of cooperation are associated with different evolutionary
dynamics: when cooperators and defectors coexist, this
is characterized by a large standard deviation and also
by larger values of the link strategy index, as indicated
by the red point B in panels a and b. Conversely, when
either cooperators or defectors dominate, the standard
deviation is lowest, as is the link strategy index. The
new state, therefore, is a direct consequence of the di-
versity in the players’ strategic identities; when diversity
is lost and one recovers the case of a single strategy per
player, only stationary states are observed and for suffi-
ciently large b/c these are made of all cooperators, or for
b/c < 〈k〉 of all defectors.
Furthermore, comparing the two rows in Fig. 1 indi-
cates that, while our observations are equally valid for SF
and ER networks and are thus robust against variations
in topology, temporal fluctuations are stronger in hetero-
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FIG. 3. Increasing the connectivity density enhances time fluctuations, and the overall scenario is preserved
with changing network size. Heatmaps (colorbars on top) of ρ (panels a and d), σρ (panels b and e), and ` (panels c and
f) in the parameter space (α, b/c). As compared with Fig. 1, data here refer to SF networks with a larger average degree (top
row, N = 1, 000, 〈k〉 = 8), and with a larger size (bottom row, N = 5, 000, 〈k〉 = 8). Each point is furthermore obtained by
an ensemble average over 10 different network realizations. For a better visualization, isolines are drawn in panels a, b, d, and
e. The main effect of a larger 〈k〉 is that of enhancing the fluctuations in the time-dependent state, as it is visible on panel b).
On the other hand, the network size has the effect of slightly reducing the size of fluctuations (panel e), yet it has virtually no
impact on the overall scenario (panels a and d), as well as on the diversity of strategic identities (panels c and f).
geneous wirings. This is relevant because interactions in
human societies are indeed characterized by not trivial,
yet heterogeneous, connectivity patterns [31, 56–60].
Figure 2 reveals the details behind the dynamics
emerging at the three points marked by letters A, B,
and C in Fig. 1a. Looking at case A, one can observe
an almost fully steady time course of both strategy den-
sities (panel A1). Eventually, defection dominates over
cooperation, and the strategies of the individual player
do not change in time (panel A2 containing the identity
of the 100 most connected nodes in the network).
Case C, in which cooperators dominate after a tran-
sitory dynamics, exhibits a somewhat different evolution
from case A. Already early in the evolutionary process co-
operators seem destined for dominance, but residual fluc-
tuations persist over a relatively large time scale, before
eventually the population reaches the absorbing steady
state (panel C1). This is corroborated by the tempo-
ral profile of individual strategies (panels C2), which ex-
hibits fast temporal changes during the early stages of the
evolutionary process before defection recedes completely.
One here observes a maturation in the strategic choices
of individuals across their whole vector of strategies.
Case B is of particular interest as it is characterized
by the largest ensemble mean of the standard devia-
tion. Here, the coexistence of cooperators and defectors
is characterized by system-wide shifts in the dominant
strategy (panel B1). At odds with case C, maturity never
takes place, and players are forever trapped in a cycle of
individual changes that allows time-dependent coopera-
tion, but never full dominance (panel B2). In this case,
diverse strategic identities are thus a successful vehicle for
maintaining the survival of cooperation even at strongly
unfavorable b/c ratios, but not for assuring the elimina-
tion of defectors.
We have checked that regime C (full cooperation) and
regime A (full defection) are always (i.e. regardless on
the specific network realization) attained by the system
as long as the initial number of cooperating ties is, re-
spectively, above and below 10 %. As for point B, we
have verified that temporal fluctuations are really per-
sistent in the system, as they were supported over time
scales of the order of 1 million iterations of the game.
It has to be noticed, at this stage, that the dynamical
scenario reported in Figs. 1 and 2 is obtained under the
assumption that the strategy a given node i is selecting at
each step against each one of its neighbors in Λi depends
only indirectly on the payoffs collected by those nodes
in the previous step. Indeed, while the strategy taken
as reference for imitation is that played by the neighbor
with the largest accumulated payoff (and therefore its
determination includes a comparison among all payoffs
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FIG. 4. Diversity and time-dependent states are observable also for more realistic, heterogeneous, strategy
rules. Heatmaps (colorbar on the right) of the cooperation density ρ in the parameter space (α, b/c). Here, the network is
partitioned in two communities: a fraction p of randomly selected players adopts an introspective strategy updating (see text for
details), whereas the remaining fraction 1− p of players adopt the usual imitation rule. Panels a-d correspond, respectively, to
p = 0, p = 0.05, p = 0.1, and p = 0.5. As in Fig. 1, each point is obtained by an ensemble average over 10 different realizations
of SF networks with N = 1, 000 and 〈k〉 = 4. Isolines at ρ = 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9 are drawn. Other stipulations as in the caption
of Fig. 1. The results point to a remarkable robustness of the observed scenario also in the presence of heterogeneity in the
strategic updating rules, and therefore corroborate the fact that diverse strategic identities can be observed in a plethora of
practical cases.
of the neighbors of node i), the argument of the Fermi-
Dirac function in Eq. (3) is equal for all the nodes in Λi.
However, we have verified that exactly the same scenario
(with only suitable rearrangements of the parameters α
and b/c) occurs also in the case in which node i, once
adopted the reference strategy as that used against it by
its best neighbor, imitates such a strategy with differ-
ent probabilities in different links, namely by calculating
in each link ij the Fermi-Dirac function with reference
to the difference between the payoff of node j ∈ Λi and
the payoff of node i. Our choice is therefore dictated by
practical reasons: instead of having to have the exact in-
formation on all payoffs accumulated by its neighbors, we
suppose that each node i needs only to know the payoff
of the best performing node in its neighborhood Λi and
the strategy that such a node played against it in the
previous step.
We also tested the robustness of the results against
changes in network size and connectivity density. We
show in Fig. 3 the same set of color maps as in Fig. 1,
but reporting here the results obtained with SF networks
with a larger average degree (Fig. 3a-c, N = 1, 000, 〈k〉 =
8), and with a larger size (Fig. 3d-f, N = 5, 000, 〈k〉 = 8).
Contrasting the top row of Fig. 1 with Fig. 3, one real-
izes that the most fascinating features are all maintained.
The data are slightly shifted to higher b/c ratios, but not
as much as they should have been if they would have
strictly followed the b/c > 〈k〉 rule. This is not surpris-
ing given that the derivation of the rule was made in Ref.
[12] for regular networks, and in the limit of very sparse
graphs (N  〈k〉), and therefore it has to be consid-
ered as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the
transition to full cooperation.
Examining the details of Fig. 3, one also realizes that
the main effect of a larger 〈k〉 is that of enhancing the
fluctuations in the time-dependent state (panel b). We
also performed simulations (not shown here) at lower
(〈k〉 = 2) and higher (〈k〉 = 12) values of the average
degree, which confirm the enhancement of fluctuations
with increasing 〈k〉. The network size has instead the
effect of slightly reducing the size of fluctuations, yet it
has virtually no impact on the overall scenario as well as
on the diversity of strategic identities. Our results are
then validated not just in terms of variation in network
topology, but also in terms of network size and average
degree. We have also tested our results on smaller size
networks (with only N = 100 players), and we observed
identical outcomes. In terms of social models, diverse
strategic identities thus yield consistently similar results
for networks comprising just tens or thousands of indi-
viduals, and are therefore applicable for small groups and
communities, upwards to big societies.
Notice that we performed simulations also in the limit
of weak selection (α > 1), which confirmed (up to α >
10) the general scenario of a transition between a fully
defective (at low values of b/c) and a fully cooperative (at
high values of b/c) state mediated by a time-dependent
configuration where none of the two strategies is fixed and
persistent fluctuations characterize instead the dynamics
of the system.
Finally, we show that time-dependent states are ob-
servable even in more realistic situations. Indeed, the as-
sumption that players tend to imitate the strategy played
with them by their best neighbors is only reasonable if
such best neighbors are actually over-performing in terms
of the payoff. But why a player who accumulated a pay-
off better than that of its best neighbor should actually
imitate that neighbor’s strategy?
7To include this possibility, we enriched our model by
considering that a given percentage p of randomly se-
lected players does not follow the imitation rule, but
rather follows a second introspective rule which only ac-
counts for the balance between the payoffs accumulated
being a cooperator or a defector in the previous step of
the game: ∆ingi = (g
C
i − gDi )/b. In other words, we
tested the robustness of our results against variations in
the strategy updating rule, replacing in a fraction p of the
population the commonly used imitation of the fittest
with what sometimes is referred to as myopic strategy
updating [61].
Each introspective player i updates its strategies with
all its ki neighbors, taking as a reference either the strat-
egy D, if ∆ingi ≤ 0, or C, if ∆ingi > 0. If player i is al-
ready adopting along a given link the reference strategy,
the link stays unchanged, but otherwise one has the tran-
sition probabilities f(C → D) = 1/[1 + exp(∆ingi/α)]
and f(D → C) = 1/[1 + exp(−∆ingi/α)].
Introspective players are destined to assume monotonic
identities, as diversity is impossible for them in their
asymptotic state. Therefore, it is very relevant to as-
sess how far, in terms of fraction p, diversity in the sys-
tem can survive, and its effects are resilient. The results
are reported in Fig. 4, and they attest to the fact that
the outcomes reported above remain intact to a large
extent of heterogeneity in strategy rules. Namely, the
overall scenario remains almost unchanged for p = 0.05
(panel b) and p = 0.1 (panel c): system-wide shifts in
the dominant strategy and time-dependent cooperation
are always observed. As the fraction p of introspective
players increases up to p = 0.5 (panel d), one can no-
tice a shrinkage and the eventual disappearance of the
full C phase, yet the coexistence of both strategies and
thus at least the survival of cooperation remains feasible.
Taken together, this rounds up the evidence in favor of
the remarkable robustness of the presented results, and
it corroborates diverse strategic identities as applicable
in a broad plethora of different modeling scenarios.
In summary, we have introduced and studied diverse
strategic identities, with a focus on their impact on the
resulting evolutionary dynamics. Unlike bacteria and
other relatively simple forms of life which use the same
strategy for all their interactions, humans and many ani-
mals do not. It is indeed straightforward to come up with
many examples in support of this claim. From the psy-
chological point of view, differences in personality, lack
of confidence, and simply growing up and maturing as
an individual are most commonly named as reasons for
acting differently around different people [36, 37]. When
studying evolutionary games on networks, it is thus fit-
ting to replace a single strategy of an individual with a
strategy vector, such that it is possible for that individual
to use different strategies in all its interactions.
We have focused on social dilemmas, and the pris-
oner’s dilemma game in particular, as the most impor-
tant and frequently used subclass of evolutionary games
[52], and we have considered SF and ER networks of
different sizes and with different average degrees. We
have also considered part of the network population us-
ing an introspective strategy adoption rule besides the
more commonly used imitation of the fittest [61]. We
have shown that, largely regardless of the particularities
of the implementation, diverse strategic identities give
rise to evolutionary dynamics that is unseen in the mono-
tonic case. Our results include sudden systemic shifts and
oscillations of dominant strategies in the network. These
sometimes support cooperation where it would otherwise
perish, but sometimes also supporting defection where
otherwise cooperators would dominate. Furthermore, we
have observed time-dependent cooperation and matura-
tion in individual strategic choices, where players initially
change their strategies frequently and use different strate-
gies with different neighbors, only to eventually converge
to an essentially monotonic strategy in time. However,
without the ability to use different strategies with dif-
ferent neighbors, the global evolutionary outcome would
have been altogether very different.
Given the high and robust degree to which diverse
strategic identities affect the evolutionary dynamics on
networks, and given the ubiquity of mathematical mod-
els based on evolutionary games in mitigating adverse
climate change [28, 29], improving imperfect vaccination
outcomes [32, 35], containing epidemic spreading [31], ed-
ucating against the overuse of antibiotics [34], and pre-
serving biodiversity [30], we argue that truly applicable
models of the future should relax the one strategy for
all limitation and embrace the freedom and complexity
of more realistic diverse strategic identities. As our re-
search shows, this allows individuals to carefully gauge
their strategic vectors, which can lead to socially opti-
mal outcomes that would otherwise remain hidden or
completely unattainable.
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